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1 It is both an honour and a privilege for us to contribute this paper to the festschrift 
dedicated to Professor Ian Fletcher QC. Insolvency law and practice around the 
world owes a huge debt of gratitude to Ian’s scholarship and vision which helped 
develop insolvency law and ensure that it is a discipline that can be regarded as 
critical in the commercial world across the globe. It is largely due to Professor 
Fletcher’s influence that we both entered the world of insolvency in academia, so it 
is fitting that this paper should be dedicated to him. 
 
 
                                                 
✝ The ratio of 4:3:2:1 referred to in the title is a reference to the ratio in which appointments are to be 
made in terms of the approved Ministerial Policy for the appointment of insolvency practitioners, and 
which has since been challenged on constitutional grounds in SA Restructuring and Insolvency 
Practitioners Association v Minister of Justice and Constitutional Development and Others, and 
Another Application 2015 (2) SA 430 (WCC). This case and the Ministerial Policy are discussed in this 
paper. 
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Introduction 
 
2 Over the years a spirited debate has taken place regarding the reform of the 
insolvency laws in South Africa in general.1 In the South African context the 
transformation theme remains a complex and controversial subject, and as such it is 
imperative that law reform takes place on the basis of a rational, structured policy 
approach. It has been argued that globalisation is a development that is having a 
profound impact on the subject of economics as a whole - to such an extent that it 
has become the defining process of the present age.2 This development raises 
questions concerning the value to be obtained from conformity to such global 
standards, balanced against a distinctive and unique national path that reflects the 
peculiarities of national historical, cultural and legal developments.3 Any attempt to 
regulate the insolvency profession should be done within the context of generally 
accepted social, political and economic goals, but nonetheless also produce a 
system where practitioners would be required to have the skills, knowledge and 
experience so as to maintain the integrity of the insolvency system and the 
insolvency profession. The challenge will therefore lie in translating internationally 
identified standards and norms into the South African national context. 
 
3 A secondary theme has been the establishment of a democratic constitutional 
dispensation in South Africa since the first democratic elections in 1994. The 
Constitution4 provides the context and outline within which any government policy 
should be developed and formulated and legislation giving effect to that policy can 
be enacted and interpreted.5 The basis of constitutionalism is that the power of the 
state is defined and confined by law to protect the interests of society.6 Any law 
reform process should thus aspire to comply with the underlying values of the 
Constitution.7 This sentiment is echoed by Evans: 
 
                                                 
1 See A. Loubser, “An International Perspective on the Regulation of Insolvency Practitioners” (2007) 
SA Mercantile Law Journal 123; J. Calitz and A. Boraine, “The Role of the Master of the High Court 
as Regulator in a Changing Liquidation Environment: A South African Perspective” (2005) (4) Journal 
of South African Law 728, at 734; J. Calitz and D. Burdette, “The Appointment of Insolvency 
Practitioners in South Africa: Time for Change?”(2006) (4) Journal of South African Law 721. 
2 E. Loots, “Globalisation, Emerging Markets and the South African Economy” (2005) 70(2) South 
African Journal of Economics 123. 
3 T.C. Halliday, “Lawmaking and Institution Building in Asian Insolvency Reforms: Between Global 
Norms and National Circumstances”, Chapter 1 in Organisation for Economic Co-operation and 
Development, Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development Asian Insolvency Systems 
Closing the Implementation Gap (2007, OECD Publishing, Paris), at 17. 
4 The Constitution of South Africa Act of 1996 (hereinafter referred to as “the Constitution”). 
5 C. Hoexter, Administrative Law in South Africa (2nd ed) (2012, Juta & Co, Cape Town), at 22. 
6 Y. Burns and M. Beukes, Administrative Law under the 1996 Constitution (3rd ed) (2006, 
LexisNexis Butterworths, Durban), at 28. 
7 See S v Makwanyane 1995 6 BCLR 665 (CC); 1995 3 SA 391 (CC) at 262. See also J. Calitz, “A 
Reformatory Approach to State Regulation of Insolvency Law in South Africa” (unpublished LLD 
thesis, University of Pretoria, 2009), in Chapter 4. 
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“In formulating new legislation the question is not whether constitutional requirements, 
underpinned by human rights interests, must form an integral part thereof, but rather to what 
extent policy changes should occur in order to align such legislation with the required 
constitutional principles and expectations, and how to achieve this while maintaining or 
balancing the interests of creditors, debtors, society and the state.”8 
 
4 In a previous article published nine years ago,9 we discussed in some detail the 
appointment of insolvency practitioners in South Africa. At the time we were of the 
opinion that it was time for the largely unregulated insolvency profession in South 
Africa to be properly regulated, and called for change. In that article we traced the 
history of the appointment of insolvency practitioners in South Africa,10 discussed 
the manner in which appointments were made at the time, and also discussed the 
various Ministerial Policy documents that had been published up to that point.11 We 
also argued very strongly for the statutory regulation of insolvency practitioners, 
the abolition of the requisition system that is used for making provisional 
appointments, and for proper qualification and other entry-level requirements.12 
None of our calls have been heeded, however, and the situation now seems to be at 
its lowest point ever. 
 
5 A recent decision in the Western Cape High Court,13 dealing with the duly 
published Ministerial Policy in relation to the appointment of insolvency 
practitioners, gave us pause for thought and an opportunity to revisit this topic, 
especially since there appears to have been no real positive change since we 
published our article in 2006. While we do not intend regurgitating everything 
stated in our previous article, for the sake of completeness, and in order to fully 
understand the issues raised here, there will be some repetition. The points already 
raised and that are repeated here, are to reinforce our stance that South Africa is 
heading the wrong way regarding the implementation of its latest Ministerial Policy 
for the appointment of insolvency practitioners. 
 
6 It also needs to be stated that there have been some legislative changes in South 
Africa since our article appeared in 2006. In 2011 South Africa introduced a new 
Companies Act14 to replace the previous 1973 Act,15 and by so doing has replaced 
the out-dated corporate rescue mechanism of judicial management with the more 
modern procedure known as “business rescue”. The further effect of this change is 
                                                 
8 R. Evans, A Critical Analysis of Problem Areas in Respect of Assets of Insolvent Estates of 
Individuals (unpublished LLD thesis, University of Pretoria, 2009), at 428. 
9 Calitz and Burdette, above note 1, at 721-751. 
10 Ibid, at 722-728. 
11 Ibid, at 729-736. 
12 Ibid, at 749-750. 
13 SA Restructuring and Insolvency Practitioners Association v Minister of Justice and Constitutional 
Development and Others, and Another Application 2015 (2) SA 430 (WCC). 
14 Companies Act 71 of 2008 (hereinafter referred to as “the 2008 Companies Act”). Although the Act 
was passed in 2008, it only came into operation on 1 May 2011 - Proc. No. R32, Gazette No. 34239, 
dated 26 April 2011. 
15 Companies Act 61 of 1973 (hereinafter referred to as “the 1973 Companies Act”). 
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that it has given rise to the birth of a new profession related to insolvency, namely 
the business rescue practitioner profession. This new profession is regulated by 
Chapter 6 of the 2008 Companies Act, and seeks to clearly segregate it from that of 
the insolvency profession. 
 
7 The main objectives of this paper are to briefly analyse the Ministerial Policy for 
the appointment of insolvency practitioners in South Africa against the backdrop of 
international best practice regarding the regulation of insolvency practitioners, to 
have a brief look at the case in which the Ministerial Policy was struck down as 
being unconstitutional, and to make some observations regarding a possible way 
forward for South Africa. 
 
 




8 As a starting point it is important to take note of the fact that the provisions 
contained in the Insolvency Act17 and the 1973 Companies Act are completely out 
of step with what actually takes place in practice when it comes to the appointment 
of insolvency practitioners (trustees and liquidators respectively) in South Africa. 
 
9 Since South Africa has a creditor-friendly insolvency system, the wishes of 
creditors carry a lot of weight in the administration of insolvent estates. This can be 
seen from many of the provisions contained in both the Insolvency Act and the 
1973 Companies Act.18 South African insolvency law does however not provide for 
so called creditors’ committees as is often the case in other creditor-friendly 
jurisdictions and instead applies the principle of creditors’ meetings to afford 
creditors the opportunity to protect their interests and participating in the general 
administration of the estate.19 
 
                                                 
16 For a discussion of the historical context of the appointment of insolvency practitioners in South 
Africa, see Calitz and Burdette, above note 1, at 722-728. 
17 Insolvency Act, Act 24 of 1936 (hereinafter referred to as “the Insolvency Act”). 
18 The whole purpose, for example, of convening creditors’ meetings is for the trustee or liquidator to 
obtain instructions from the creditors regarding the manner in which the estate in question must be 
wound up. 
19 A. Boraine and J. Calitz, “Some Consequences of the National Credit Act 34 of 2005 on the Proof of 
Claims in Insolvency Law” (2010) (4) Journal of South African Law at 798. See also section 40(1) of 
the Insolvency Act. 
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Statutory Provisions Relating to Appointments 
 
Appointments under the Insolvency Act 
 
10 As a starting point, and in the absence of a properly regulated insolvency 
profession, it is worth making a brief reference to some of the case law that 
explains the role of the insolvency practitioner under South African insolvency law. 
In Standard Bank of South Africa v The Master of the High Court,20 the court 
stated that the practitioner occupies a position of trust towards creditors and 
companies in liquidation, and is required to be independent and to regard equally 
the interest of all creditors. The insolvency practitioner is also expected to carry out 
his duties without fear, favour or prejudice.21 In Ex parte: Master of the High Court 
of South Africa (North Gauteng),22 it was also confirmed that there can be no doubt 
that the office of trustee or liquidator is one of trust toward creditors and the 
insolvent debtor, and also toward the Master and the Court.23 A trustee or liquidator 
can also be held personally liable for negligence causing loss to others arising out 
of the performance of his duties.24 
 
11 Section 18(1) of the Insolvency Act makes provision for the appointment of a 
provisional trustee by the Master of the High Court. Section 18(1) reads as follows 
(emphasis provided): 
 
“As soon as an estate has been sequestrated (whether provisionally or finally) or when a 
person appointed as trustee ceases to be trustee or to function as such, the master may, in 
accordance with policy determined by the Minister, appoint a provisional trustee to the 
estate in question who shall give security to the satisfaction of the master for the proper 
performance of his or her duties as provisional trustee and shall hold office until the 
appointment of a trustee.”25 
 
12 When interpreting this subsection it is clear that the legislature intended that the 
appointment of a provisional trustee should be an extraordinary appointment, the 
word “may” signifying that it was not the intention that such an appointment should 
be made in respect of all estates.26 Unfortunately the legislature did not elaborate 
on the relevant criteria the Master should apply when making the appointment, and 
as a result the making of provisional appointments falls solely within his 
discretion.27 In this vein it has been stated that the Master has an unfettered and 
                                                 
20 (Eastern Cape Division) [2010] ZASCA 4; 2010 (4) SA 405 (SCA); 2010 3 All SA 135 (SCA) (19 
February 2010). 
21 Ibid., at paragraph 97. 
22 2011 (5) SA 311 (GNP); [2011] ZAGPPHC 105; 28042/11 (27 June 2011). 
23 Ibid., at paragraph 16. 
24 Kerbels Flooring and Carpeting (Pty) Ltd v Shrosbree 1994 (1) SA 655 (SEC). 
25 As amended by section 3, Judicial Matters Amendment Act 16 of 2003 (emphasis added). 
26 Calitz and Burdette, above note 1, at 729. See also J. Kunst et al., Meskin, Insolvency Law and its 
Operation in Winding-up (LexisNexis, loose-leaf ed issue 44), at paragraph 4.1 (hereinafter referred to 
as “Meskin”). 
27 Calitz and Burdette, above note 1, at 730. 
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exclusive administrative discretion to appoint a provisional trustee of his choice.28 
In regard to the question as to why it is necessary for the Master to have such a 
discretion, the Court in Ex Parte the Master of the High Court South Africa (North 
Gauteng)29 held that the Master is the only functionary entitled to appoint 
provisional trustees, liquidators and judicial managers, taking into account 
creditors’ directives. In so doing the Court stated the following in regard to the 
rationale for the wide discretion granted to the Master: 
 
“An organisation of this nature has the institutional knowledge and expertise to apply 
policy, and to assess the ability and integrity of trustees and liquidators, and is therefore able 
to judge whether or not individuals are duly qualified to be appointed, either at all or to a 
specific estate.”30 
 
13 A court may order the Master to exercise his discretion properly, but will only in 
exceptional circumstances substitute its own decision for that of the Master.31 
 
14 Section 54 of the Insolvency Act contains the rules for the election of a final 
trustee at the first meeting of creditors. In terms of section 54(2) of the Insolvency 
Act, any person who has obtained a majority in number and in value of the votes of 
the creditors entitled to vote, and who voted at such meeting, is elected as the 
trustee of that estate. It bears mentioning that section 54(1) states that the creditors 
may elect one or two trustees at the first meeting of creditors.32 Considering the 
rather detailed provisions relating to the appointment of a final trustee, it is rather 
surprising to find an absolute lack of legislative rules relating to the appointment of 
provisional trustees.33 This further entrenches the view that the appointment of a 
provisional trustee was meant to be an extraordinary appointment by the Master. 
 
15 It is also worth mentioning the provisions of section 18(4) of the Insolvency 
Act, which provide for the appointment of the provisional trustee as final trustee 
when no person has been elected as the final trustee at the first meeting of creditors. 
The relevant section reads as follows: 
 
“When a meeting of creditors for the election of a trustee has been held in terms of section 
                                                 
28 Lipschitz v Wattrus 1980 1 SA 662 (T) 671. See also Meskin, above note 26, at paragraph 4.1. As to 
whether the Master still has an unfettered discretion, see Calitz and Burdette, above note 1, at footnote 
93 as well as Master of the High Court Northern Gauteng High Court, Pretoria v Motala (172/11) 
[2011] ZASCA 238; 2012 (3) SA 325 (SCA) (1 December 2011), at paragraph 14. 
29 Above note 22, at paragraph 33. 
30 Ibid., at paragraph 26. 
31 Cf UWC v MEC for Health and Social Services 1998 (3) SA 124 (C), at 130F. 
32 The reason for this is that the voting rules in section 54, Insolvency Act are taken a step further due 
to the fact that it may transpire that no one person has the majority of the votes in both number and 
value. It frequently occurs that one person obtains the majority of the votes in value, while another 
person obtains the majority of the votes in number. In such a case both persons will be elected as (co-) 
trustees of the estate in question. 
33 Although there are no legislative rules for the appointment of provisional trustees, the Master has 
developed a set of criteria for this purpose – this is dealt with in more detail below. 
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forty and no trustee has been elected, and the Master has appointed a provisional trustee in 
the estate in question, the Master shall appoint him as trustee on his finding such additional 
security as the master may have required.” 
 
16 Finally, it is to be noted that the Master has the discretion to appoint a co-trustee 
at any time if he or she deems it appropriate in the circumstances.34 This brings to 
three the total number of trustees that may be appointed in estates under 
sequestration.35 
 
Appointments under the 1973 Companies Act36 
 
17 Section 368 of the 1973 Companies Act makes provision for the appointment of 
a provisional liquidator in the case of a company being wound up by the court or by 
resolution.37 Section 368 reads as follows: 
 
“As soon as a winding-up order has been made in relation to a company, or a special 
resolution for a voluntary winding-up of a company has been registered in terms of section 
200, the Master may, in accordance with policy determined by the Minister, appoint any 
suitable person as provisional liquidator of the company concerned, who shall give security 
to the satisfaction of the master for the proper performance of his or her duties as 
provisional liquidator and who shall hold office until the appointment of a liquidator.”38 
 
18 Even though the section is similarly worded to section 18(1) of the Insolvency 
Act, Meskin39 is of the opinion, with reference to section 361(1) of the 1973 
Companies Act, that section 368 intends that the Master should ordinarily make 
such an appointment. This is probably due to the fact that the section provides for 
the property of the company to fall under the custody and control of the Master 
until the appointment of a provisional liquidator. Despite the wording of section 
361(1), it is nevertheless submitted that provisional liquidators are also supposed to 
be appointed as extraordinary appointments, although a far more cogent case can be 
made for the appointment of a provisional liquidator than for the appointment of a 
provisional trustee. 
 
19 One important difference between the wording of section 368 of the 1973 
Companies Act and section 18(1) of the Insolvency Act, is that section 368 requires 
the appointment of a “suitable” person as provisional liquidator. By “suitable” is 
                                                 
34 Section 57(5), Insolvency Act. 
35 This is of interest considering that the Master has on occasion appointed more than three trustees to 
administer the estate in question. 
36 The winding-up provisions contained in Chapter XIV of the 1973 Companies Act continue to apply 
pursuant to the provisions of item 9 of Schedule 5 of the 2008 Companies Act, notwithstanding the 
repeal of the 1973 Companies Act with effect from 1 May 2011. 
37 This paper only deals with appointments made by the Master in the case of a company being wound 
up by the court, although similar rules apply in the case of a company being wound up voluntarily by 
resolution. 
38 As amended by section 16, Judicial Matters Amendment Act 16 of 2003 (emphasis provided). 
39 Meskin, above note 26. 
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meant an independent person who is able to discharge the responsibilities of such 
office competently, honestly and impartially.40 It should be noted that as far back as 
1998 Flemming, DJP confirmed the view that some liquidators acted dishonestly 
when he stated that liquidators and trustees were regarded by many as ineffective 
and “even sometimes disrespected in regard to integrity”.41 
 
20 As far as the election of a final liquidator is concerned, the rules for the election 
of such a person are the same as those provided for in the Insolvency Act,42 
although there is one significant difference in that the separate meetings of 
members (shareholders) and creditors may nominate and elect different persons for 
appointment as final liquidator, and in such a case the Master must appoint both 
such persons.43 The Master also has the authority to appoint a co-liquidator at any 
time should he or she deem it “desirable”.44 
 
Non-Statutory Criteria Relating to Appointments 
 
The Master’s “Panel” of Trustees and Liquidators 
 
21 Although the Insolvency Act sets out certain disqualification criteria for the 
appointment of trustees,45 it does not categorically state who should be appointed 
by the Master as a provisional or final trustee. By contrast, the 1973 Companies 
Act requires that a “suitable person” should be appointed by the Master as 
provisional or final liquidator,46 although this Act also contains a list of 
disqualifications.47 
 
22 It is quite alarming that nothing has ever been done to regulate the insolvency 
profession by establishing certain minimum criteria that aspirant trustees and 
liquidators have to comply with prior to being appointed as an insolvency 
practitioner. However, the Master, of his own accord, commenced the use of a 
register to which he could add the names of persons who, in his view, qualified for 
appointment as an insolvency practitioner. In time this became known as the 
“Master’s Panel” of trustees and liquidators. To this day no person whose name 
does not appear in the register may be appointed as a trustee or a liquidator in an 
                                                 
40 See e.g. Murray v Edendale Estates Ltd 1908 TS 17 22; In re Greatrex Footwear (Pty) Ltd (II) 1936 
NPD 536 537-539; Wolstenholme v Hartley Farmers Agricultural Co-operative Co Ltd 1965 4 SA 73 
(SR); Ex parte Clifford Homes Construction (Pty) Ltd 1989 4 SA 610 (W), at 614; Krumm v The 
Master 1989 3 SA 944 (D). 
41 Beinash & Co v Nathan (Standard Bank of SA Ltd Intervening) 1998 3 SA 540 (W), at paragraph 
545D. See also J. Calitz, “Some Thoughts on State Regulation of South African Insolvency Law” 
(2011) 44(2) De Jure 290; A. Loubser, above note 1, at 123. 
42 Section 364(2), 1973 Companies Act. 
43 Ibid., section 369(2). 
44 Ibid., section 374. 
45 See section 55, Insolvency Act for a list of these disqualifications. 
46 Section 368, 1973 Companies Act. 
47 Ibid., section 372. 
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insolvent estate. In order for a practitioner’s name to be added to the register, 
prospective trustees and liquidators have to submit an application to the relevant 
Master’s office. 
 
23 Although each Master’s office has a different modus operandi when it comes to 
the addition of prospective trustees’ and liquidators’ names on the panel, the 
procedure usually consists of the submission of certain documentation to the 
Master, followed by an interview of the candidate by a panel consisting of 
personnel from the relevant Master’s office.48 The required documentation was 
usually submitted in terms of a checklist dealing inter alia with the following 
aspects of the administration of estates: the applicant’s experience in the field of 
insolvency;49 the applicant’s infrastructure, such as office space, telephone and 
facsimile facilities, personnel, etc.; the applicant’s ability to provide short-term 
insurance (security); and the applicant’s formal and other qualifications, if any. The 
purpose of the interview is to determine whether or not the person has the requisite 
knowledge and infrastructure, and to determine whether or not the person is “fit and 
proper”, to act as an insolvency practitioner.50 
 
24 A Master’s Directive was recently issued with the aim of ensuring that all 
Masters implement the process of appointing insolvency practitioners in a 
consistent and transparent manner. The directive provides for the integration of all 
active practitioners on to a national list, ensuring that only practitioners who have 
indicated that they have sufficient infrastructure and are willing to take 
appointments in specific centres are now included on the so-called national list. The 
directive still provides for the discretionary appointment of “BEE/PDI” (black 
economic empowerment/previously disadvantaged individual) appointments in 
alphabetical order from a provincial list kept at each office.51 
 
25 While this directive no doubt goes a long way towards ensuring consistency 
amongst the various offices, it is far from perfect and the main point of concern 
remains that the Master’s so-called “panel” does not have any legal status.52 
 
                                                 
48 In the past the interview panel would also consist of one or more practicing liquidators representing 
either SARIPA (South African Restructuring and Insolvency Practitioners Association) - or its 
predecessor AIPSA (Association of Insolvency Practitioners of Southern Africa) - or AABIP 
(Association for the Advancement of Black Insolvency Practitioners), or both. This practice has 
apparently been discontinued, although it is unclear when it was discontinued. 
49 Usually contained in a curriculum vitae submitted by the applicant. 
50 Completion of the SARIPA programme in Insolvency Law and Practice also used to be regarded as 
an additional recommendation for any prospective insolvency practitioner seeking to be placed on the 
panel, although this is no longer the case. While it is not clear when the SARIPA programme was 
discontinued as an additional recommendation, the current additional recommendation is a bachelors or 
masters degree in law or commerce. 
51 See Chief Master’s Directive 1 of 2015 dated 30 March 2015, available at: 
<http://www.justice.gov.za/master/m_docs/2015-01_chm-directive.pdf> [last viewed 30 August 2015]. 
52 Calitz, above note 41, at 301. 
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The “Requisition System” 
 
26 In terms of section 20(1)(a) of the Insolvency Act, the estate of an insolvent 
vests first in the Master and then in the trustee once one has been appointed. In 
terms of section 361(1) of the Companies Act, the assets of a company in 
liquidation fall under the custody and control first of the Master and then of the 
liquidator once one has been appointed. This is important in the context of the 
making of provisional appointments by the Master in insolvent estates. 
 
27 In 1977, the then Master of the Supreme Court issued a directive53 stating that 
due to the fact that insolvent estates vested in the Master, or fell under his custody 
and control, and due to the fact that the Master could not sufficiently protect the 
interests of creditors until such time as a trustee or liquidator had been appointed at 
the first meeting of creditors, the Master was implementing a system whereby a 
provisional trustee or liquidator would be appointed, as far as possible, in all 
insolvent estates. By making such an appointment the Master would be divested of 
the estate and the appointee could take the necessary steps to protect the interests of 
creditors in that particular estate.54 
 
28 However, the Master obviously also wanted to avoid the situation where one 
person is appointed as the provisional trustee or liquidator, and another as the final 
trustee or liquidator at the first meeting of creditors. It is of course desirable, as far 
as possible, to have some form of continuity in the persons that are appointed as 
both provisional and final trustee or liquidator. In order to assist the Master in 
appointing a person as the provisional trustee or liquidator who would in all 
probability also be elected as the final trustee or liquidator, the Master introduced 
what is today known as the “requisition system”.55 It is worth noting that in the 
unreported decision of Prosch v Standard Bank of South Africa56 Roux J stated that 
he simply could not accept that the Master applied a practice to appoint the person 
recommended by the majority in value of creditors as the provisional trustee or 
liquidator, as this was at odds with the Master’s unfettered discretion to appoint a 
suitable person.57 
 
29 The requisition system entails the submission of nominations by the creditors of 
the estate as to who should be appointed as the provisional trustee or liquidator. In 
                                                 
53 The “directive” was sent to all insolvency practitioners by the Master in the form of a letter, 
informing them that the Master would in future ask for nominations from creditors prior to making a 
provisional appointment. 
54 The appointment of an insolvency practitioner is the most effective means of protecting the interests 
of creditors, which of course is what the legislature intended. See Meskin, above note 26, at paragraph 
4.1 and the authority quoted therein. 
55 For a discussion of the reasons for the introduction of the requisition system, see Meskin, above note 
26, at paragraph 4.1. 
56 Case number 14279/90, Witwatersrand Local Division of the High Court. 
57 Lipschitz v Wattrus 1980 (1) SA 662 (T), at 671G. 
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order to allow the creditors sufficient time to lodge their nominations, the Master 
usually does not make a provisional appointment until 48 hours have elapsed from 
the moment of the granting of the sequestration or liquidation order by the court.58 
 
30 One of the problematic aspects proffered in regard to this system is that the 
Master is supposed to have an unfettered discretion as to who is appointed as the 
provisional trustee or liquidator.59 It has always been the Master’s view that the 
requisitions are used as a guide only, and that appointments are not issued as a 
matter of course to the person who has received the majority of the support in 
number and value by virtue of the nominations of creditors. It has occurred 
frequently in the past that the Master is accused of acting mechanically when 
making provisional appointments in terms of the nominations made by creditors.60 
When the Department of Justice issued a policy document relating to the 
appointment of previously disadvantaged individuals,61 which effectively obliged 
the Master to appoint certain persons as trustees and liquidators in estates above a 
certain value, further problems arose as regards the Master exercising an 
“unfettered discretion” when making provisional appointments. 
 
31 Over the years there have unfortunately been continuous allegations of 
irregularities regarding the application of the requisition system in practice, for 
example the submission of false requisitions and the duplication of requisitions in 
various estates. It is clear that the application of the requisition system in practice is 
flawed, and the following aspects can be pointed out as inherent weaknesses of the 
system: 
 
 requisitions are not made under oath,62 which makes the content of many of them 
questionable; 
 the requisition system encourages active touting amongst insolvency practitioners, in that 
                                                 
58 This is the practice in the office of the Master of the High Court in Pretoria. Other offices of the 
Master do not necessarily follow this modus operandi, e.g. the Cape Town Master’s office will make an 
appointment as soon as possible after the granting of a sequestration or liquidation order. In an attempt 
to centralise the list of names of persons suitable for appointment, the Chief Master recently published 
a national list of active insolvency practitioners, although it is not clear if a uniform procedure is now 
also applied in making provisional appointments. 
59 See Meskin, above note 26, at paragraph 4.1. 
60 It should be clear that the Master can hardly be said to be exercising his or her discretion when 
appointments are made mechanically in terms of a system whereby the creditors nominate a provisional 
trustee or liquidator. However, it has to be emphasised that all the Master wished to achieve was the 
appointment of a person as trustee or liquidator who would in all probability be elected by the creditors 
at the first meeting of creditors. 
61 This issue is dealt with in more detail below. 
62 The importance of this is that creditors may only vote for the appointment of a trustee or liquidator at 
the first meeting of creditors if they have proved their claims. Claims are proved under oath in terms of 
section 44, Insolvency Act. By appointing a person on the basis of the requisition system, the 
nominating creditors have not yet proved formal claims under oath, and in many instances the 
nominating creditors do not prove claims at all. This in effect means that the provisional trustee or 
liquidator, who is eventually appointed as the final trustee or liquidator, does not necessarily have the 
majority support of the creditors who do eventually prove their claims. 
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creditors are actively canvassed for their support in the 48 hours following the granting 
of a sequestration or liquidation order; 
 there is no credible system at the Master’s office for the monitoring of the submission of 
requisitions, which often results in submitted requisitions being “lost” in the system; 
 there is no way of verifying the requisitions that are submitted in the 48-hour period, which 
allegedly results in false requisitions being submitted; 
 the requisition system has no legal status.63 
 
The Various Policy Documents issued by the Minister of Justice and Constitutional 
Development 
 
32 In the late 1990s, the Department of Justice and Constitutional Development 
realised that the insolvency industry had not transformed since democratic elections 
in 1994, and set about finding a manner in which transformation could be brought 
about swiftly and effectively. Before statutory provision was made in 2003 for the 
Minister to determine a policy on the making of provisional appointments, a 
document entitled Policy: Strategy on Procedures for Appointment of Liquidators 
and Trustees, dated June 2001 (referred to as the 2001 Policy), was issued by the 
Department of Justice and Constitutional Development.64 Several further draft 
policy documents were circulated between 2004 and 2007. In essence the 2001 
Policy document stated that in all estates above ZAR 5 million the Master would be 
obliged to appoint a “previously disadvantaged individual” (PDI) as co-trustee or 
co-liquidator, even if such person did not have the support of the creditors. The 
policy document also described who qualified as a PDI, which essentially 
amounted to the designated groups as set out in the Employment Equity Act of 
1998.65 The idea behind the policy document was to ensure that previously 
disadvantaged individuals be co-appointed with experienced practitioners who 
could in turn train the PDI co-appointment in the art of administering insolvent 
estates. Once the PDI had gained sufficient experience, he or she could then take 
appointments on his or her own. To this end, the Master of the High Court created a 
special panel for PDI appointments. 
 
33 While the objectives of the various policy documents were certainly noble in 
their intent, they did not have much success in transferring the required skills set to 
PDIs. The simple truth of the matter was that experienced practitioners resented the 
fact that they were obliged to train inexperienced practitioners, and also that they 
had to share their fees with their previously disadvantaged co-appointees. Besides 
the fact that the exercise has to a large extent been a failure in practice, allegations 
of fronting by established practitioners in order to obtain appointments via the PDI 
                                                 
63 See Meskin, above note 26, at paragraph 4.1. 
64 This is an unsigned document, and there is doubt whether the Minister ever approved it. The 
document was amended on 8 September 2003 by a document signed by a Mr Lategan, who at the time 
was the Director: Insolvency Appointments and Interrogations. The so-called “Lategan document” was 
later revoked by Chief Master’s Directive 5/2007, issued on 20 August 2007. 
65 Act 55 of 1998. 
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panel, also became rife.66 
 
34 An additional issue that surfaced as a result of the implementation of the policy 
document was the fact that it limited the Master’s discretion to make provisional 
appointments. The argument was that the Master could hardly be said to exercising 
an “unfettered discretion” when he or she was obliged to appoint certain persons as 
co-provisional trustee or liquidator in terms of a Departmental policy document. 
This problem was eventually resolved by introducing a number of amendments to 
the provisions of the Insolvency Act and the 1973 Companies Act that provide for 
the Master to apply the policy document when exercising his discretion in the 
making of appointments.67 
 
35 A concern over the years regarding the policy document was that the legislative 
amendments provided for the application of a policy document that had been 
accepted and approved by Parliament; up until the end of January 2014 this had 
never been done, the “official” policy only having been published on 7 February 
2014. The official policy was due to be implemented on 31 March 2014, but as 
discussed below this has not been possible due to the policy being challenged on 
constitutional grounds. In the meantime the Master continues to apply a policy 
document making provision for the appointment of PDIs in all estates (not only 
those in excess of ZAR 5 million), and which does not recognise white women as 
previously disadvantaged individuals. 
 
 
The Published or “Official” Ministerial Policy 
 
36 Although the amendment to section 18(1) and the introduction of section 158(2) 
of the Insolvency Act, making provision for the introduction of a Ministerial 
Policy, were introduced on 9 July 2004, the policy itself was only published for the 
first time on 7 February 2014.68 The policy was due to become effective on 31 
March 2014,69 but an application to review the policy on constitutional grounds in 
the Western Cape High Court resulted in an interdict against the implementation of 
the policy until the matter had been adjudicated upon.70 In an attempt to address at 
                                                 
66 The Deputy Minister of Justice confirmed the allegation of irregularities in a speech to the 
Association for the Advancement of Black Insolvency Practitioners. The speech was initially available 
at: 
 <http//:www.doj.gov.za/ 2004dojsite/m_speeches/sp2005/2005_10_28_assoc_black_insolvency.htm> 
(link no longer active). 
67 Section 368 was amended, and section 15(1A) inserted, by sections 16 and 15 (respectively), Judicial 
Matters Amendment Act 16 of 2003. The amendments make provision for the Minister to determine 
the policy for the appointment of, inter alia, provisional liquidators and trustees. 
68 Government Gazette No 37287, dated 7 February 2014. 
69 Ministerial Policy, at paragraph 8. 
70 The Western Cape High Court has since ruled on the review application in SA Restructuring and 
Insolvency Practitioners Association v Minister of Justice and Constitutional Development and 
Others; and Another Application, above note 13. This case is dealt with in more detail below. 
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least one of the issues being considered by the Court in the review of the policy, the 
Minister published an amended policy on 17 October 2014.71 
 
37 The policy replaces all previous policies and guidelines relating to the 
appointment of insolvency practitioners and is intended to form the basis of the 
transformation of the insolvency industry.72 The objective of the policy is stated to 
be: 
 
“to promote consistency, fairness, transparency and the achievement of equality for persons 
previously disadvantaged by unfair discrimination.”73 
 
38 In terms of paragraph 4 of the policy, the Minister is stated to be committed to: 
 
 addressing the imbalances of the past and transforming the insolvency industry;  
 establishing uniform procedures for the appointment of insolvency practitioners;  
 making the insolvency industry accessible to individuals from previously disadvantaged 
communities;  
 promoting the objectives of the Broad-Based Black Economic Empowerment Act, 2003, by 
empowering insolvency practitioners who are previously disadvantaged individuals; and 
 preventing corruption and fronting; and 
 promoting transparency and accountability. 
 
39 A noticeable omission from the policy document is any mention of the transfer 
of the necessary skills in order to act as an insolvency practitioner. In terms of 
paragraph 3.2.1, the policy only applies to: 
 
(i) the appointment of a curator bonis;74 
(ii) the appointment of a provisional trustee by the Master;75 
(iii) the appointment of a trustee where one has not been elected by the creditors and 
no provisional trustee is in office;76 
(iv) where the Master declines to appoint an elected trustee;77 
(v) where the Master considers it desirable to appoint a co-trustee;78 
(vi) the appointment of a provisional trustee pending the election of a trustee to fill a 
vacancy;79 and 
(vii) the appointment of a trustee where there is no trustee to distribute proceeds due 
to a secured creditor who did not previously prove a claim.80 
 
40 Under the 1973 Companies Act the policy applies only to:81 
                                                 
71 Notice 798 in Government Gazette No 38088 dated 17 October 2014. 
72 Ministerial Policy, at paragraph 3.1. 
73 Ibid., at paragraph 2. 
74 Section 5(2), Insolvency Act 1936. 
75 Ibid., section 18(1). 
76 Ibid., section 54(5). 
77 Ibid., section 57(4). 
78 Ibid., section 57(5). 
79 Ibid., section 62(2). 
80 Ibid., section 95(4). 
81 Ministerial Policy, at paragraph 3.2.2. 
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(i) the appointment of a provisional liquidator by the Master;82 
(ii) where the Master declines to appoint a person nominated at a meeting of 
creditors;83 
(iii) where the Master considers it desirable to a appoint a co-liquidator;84 and 
(iv) the appointment of a provisional liquidator or liquidator to fill a vacancy.85 
 
41 In relation to the Close Corporations Act,86 the policy applies only to:87 
 
(i) the appointment of a liquidator;88 
(ii) the appointment of a co-liquidator;89 and 
(iii) the appointment of a liquidator where the Master declines to appoint an elected 
liquidator.90 
 
42 The policy does not apply to the appointment of an insolvency practitioner for a 
solvent company being wound up in terms of the provisions of section 80 of the 
2008 Companies Act.91 The policy provides for the Master to create a list from 
which appointments are to be made under four different categories.92 These 
categories, which must be arranged in alphabetical order,93 are: 
 
 Category A: African, Coloured, Indian and Chinese females who became South 
African citizens before 27 April 1994; 
 Category B: African, Coloured, Indian and Chinese males who became South African 
citizens before 27 April 1994; 
 Category C: White females who became South African citizens before 27 April 1994; 
 Category D: African, Coloured, Indian and Chinese females and males, and White 
females, who have become South African citizens on or after 27 April 1994 and 
White males who are South African citizens. 
 
43 Insolvency practitioners whose names are added to the list after the compilation 
thereof, must be added to the list at the end of the relevant category.94 In terms of 
paragraph 6.2 the Master’s list must distinguish between “senior practitioners” and 
“junior practitioners”. A “senior practitioner” is an insolvency practitioner who has 
been appointed as such at least once a year for the past five years. A “junior 
practitioner” is an insolvency practitioner who has not been appointed as such at 
least once a year for the past five years, but who has satisfied the Master that he or 
                                                 
82 Section 368, 1973 Companies Act. 
83 Ibid., section 370(3)(b). 
84 Ibid., section 374. 
85 Ibid., section 377(3). 
86 Close Corporations Act 69 of 1984. 
87 Ministerial Policy, at paragraph 3.2.3. 
88 Section 74(1), Close Corporations Act. 
89 Ibid., section 66(1). 
90 Ibid., section 76(3)(b). 
91 Ministerial Policy, at paragraph 3.3. 
92 Ibid., at paragraph 6.1. 
93 Idem. 
94 Idem. 
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she has sufficient infrastructure and experience to be appointed alone. The senior 
and junior practitioners must be arranged alphabetically in the relevant Categories 
on the Master’s List.95 
 
44 When the various Masters make appointments from their lists, insolvency 
practitioners must be appointed consecutively in the following ratio: Category A – 
4: Category B – 3: Category C – 2: Category D – 1.96 This entails that the first four 
appointments will be made from category A, the next three from Category B, the 
next 2 from Category C and one from Category D. The appointments then revert to 
Category A from which the next four appointments are made, and so on. 
Appointments must be made in alphabetical order.97 However, paragraph 7.3 of the 
policy provides that the Master may nevertheless have regard to the complexity of 
the matter and the suitability of the insolvency practitioner, and may, but subject to 
any applicable law, appoint a senior practitioner jointly with the junior or senior 
practitioner appointed in alphabetical order. If the Master makes a joint 
appointment, he must record the reason for the appointment, which must be 
provided to the other insolvency practitioner if requested to do so.98 
 
45 If an insolvency practitioner who is due for appointment in accordance with the 
alphabetical list of names in a specific category on the Master’s List fails to lodge a 
bond of security99 within the stipulated time, the next insolvency practitioner on the 
Master’s List must be appointed, and the name of the person previously determined 
is moved to the back of the list.100 However, if an insolvency practitioner who is 
due for appointment in accordance with the alphabetical list of names in a specific 
category satisfies the Master that he has a conflict of interest, or a conflict of 
interest arises after the appointment, the insolvency practitioner whose name is next 
in line must be appointed, and the name of the person previously determined is 
considered for appointment when the next appointment in that category is made.101 
 
46 Without analysing the policy in any detail, on a cursory level there are already 
several concerns regarding the manner in which this new system will work. Firstly, 
whether it is good practice to make appointments purely on the basis of an 
alphabetical list of names is questionable. The levels of skill and experience of 
persons on the list will differ vastly, and stakeholders should have the right to have 
their interests protected by experienced and properly qualified insolvency 
practitioners. Secondly, it is not clear how the names will be selected from the list, 
for example whether it will be done manually or electronically, or how the integrity 
of the system will be protected. If the system is not subjected to externally 
                                                 
95 Ibid., at paragraph 6.2. 
96 Ibid., at paragraph 7.1. 
97 Ibid., at paragraph 7.2. 
98 Ibid., at paragraph 7.3. 
99 In order to ensure the proper administration of the estate. 
100 Ministerial Policy, at paragraph 7.4(a). 
101 Ibid., at paragraph 7.4(b). 
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verifiable safeguards ensuring the integrity of the appointments made in each case, 
the system may be open to corruption, or at the very least allegations of corruption. 
Thirdly, the distinction between “senior practitioners” and “junior practitioners” is 
questionable; a person who has taken one appointment as a trustee or liquidator per 
year for five years can hardly be said to be a senior practitioner. Also, the policy 
does not stipulate whether the appointments taken over the past five years are based 
on sole or joint appointments. Fourthly, the policy does not address the lack of 
proper statutory regulation of the insolvency profession, nor the lack of proper 
qualifications and training for insolvency practitioners, and it is still currently 
possible for any person, qualified or unqualified, to become an insolvency 
practitioner. 
 
SA Restructuring and Insolvency Practitioners Association v The Minister of 
Justice and Constitutional Development102 
 
47 The grounds on which the applicants, the South African Restructuring and 
Insolvency Practitioner Association (SARIPA), challenged the Ministerial Policy 
were based on four broad questions: 
 
 whether the policy unlawfully fettered the discretion of the Master in appointing provisional 
liquidators in terms of section 18(1) of the Insolvency Act;  
 whether the policy was rationally connected to its purpose;  
 whether the policy violated the equality clause of the Constitution; and  
 whether the policy failed through lack of procedural fairness – particularly a lack of 
consultation with the relevant stakeholders.  
 
48 The Court held that insofar as the policy established a rote alphabetical system 
for the appointment of liquidators, it unlawfully fettered the Master’s discretion.103 
The Court went on to state that the exercise of all public power (such as 
determining the policy) must be in conformity with the Constitution and the 
doctrine of legality; rationality is a requirement of the exercise of all public power, 
including the adoption of measures under section 9(2) of the Constitution, which 
means that the measure must relate to the purpose for which the power is given, as 
well as the information available to the functionary exercising the power.104 The 
Court also considered that the policy cannot, in forming the basis for 
transformation of the insolvency industry, change a feature of the industry’s 
regulatory framework that required a proper match between the liquidator (or 
trustee) and a particular estate.105 The Court stated that the evidence before it also 
suggested that the policy was unlikely to achieve its objectives.106 Finally, the Court 
held that it is ultimately the Master, who the Legislature has decided is responsible 
                                                 
102 Above note 13. 
103 Ibid., at paragraph 128. 
104 Ibid., at paragraphs 129–133. 
105 Ibid., at paragraph 156. 
106 Ibid., at paragraph 164. 
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for the appointment of insolvency practitioners, who must apply his discretion 
when making an appointment, whereas the Ministerial policy put in place a rigid, 
inflexible regime in which the Master effectively became a rubber stamp, 
compelled to appoint a designated person by rote from fixed lists arranged 
alphabetically and along race and gender lines.107 As a result, the Court found that 
the policy was too rigid, and as such, the Court declared it inconsistent with the 
Constitution and invalid.108 
 
49 In its judgment, the Court also referred to the fact that:109 
 
 “The Constitutional Court has emphasized that while the Constitution is a 
transformative one and that remedial action to address past injustices is a required 
and indeed a lawful imperative, such measures need to be nuanced; 
 Underpinning and in addition to the Policy unlawfully fettering the Master’s 
discretion, the facts firmly suggest that the actual Policy will not cure the mischief it 
aims to address;  
 There is no reasonable likelihood of the Policy solving problems of corruption or 
fronting, nor of advancing the transformative agenda required by the Constitution.” 
 
50 The Minister of Justice and Constitutional Development lodged an application 
for leave to appeal the judgment of the Western Cape High Court in this case, 
which was dismissed.110 In the meantime, however, the Supreme Court of Appeal 
has granted the Minister of Justice and Constitutional Development leave to appeal 
the judgment in the Western Cape High Court, and this appeal is due to be heard 
soon.111 Instead of focusing on the constitutionality or not of the Ministerial Policy, 
especially since this aspect is now under appeal, this paper focuses on the approach 
taken by the Government of South Africa in regulating the insolvency profession 




The Ministerial Policy Measured Against International Best Practice 
 
51 Before measuring the Ministerial Policy against the standards of international 
best practice, it is appropriate to say something generally about the transformation 
issues that are peculiar to South Africa since its transition to democracy. Insolvency 
law plays a central role and influences a substantial part of any given economy, as 
                                                 
107 Ibid., at paragraph 231. 
108 Ibid., at paragraph 232. 
109 Ibid., at paragraph 231. 
110 South African Restructuring and Insolvency Practitioners Association v Minister of Justice and 
Constitutional Development and Others; Concerned Insolvency Practitioners Association NPC and 
Others v Minister of Justice and Constitutional Development and Others [2015] 1 All SA 589 (WCC). 
111 South African Restructuring and Insolvency Practitioners Association v Minister of Justice and 
Constitutional Development and Others; Concerned Insolvency Practitioners Association NPC and 
Others v Minister of Justice and Constitutional Development and Others Case no 359/15 ordered on 
16 July 2015. 
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insolvency procedures play an important role in the willingness of creditors to lend 
in the first place and hence strengthen financial markets.112 Designing an insolvency 
framework in today’s rapidly changing commercial environment entails a 
challenging process of balancing local government policies with international best 
practice, yet constantly acknowledging the objective of bringing insolvency law 
within the South African constitutional framework. An important objective of any 
policy should be to promote the achievement of equality for those previously 
disadvantaged by unfair discrimination. The South African Constitution provides 
the basis for any type of remedial measure or programme, such as the black 
economic empowerment programme113 or affirmative action programme.114 Section 
9(2) of the Constitution also explicitly sanctions affirmative measures taken for the 
development of a more equal society, and therefore also includes actions taken to 
correct economic inequalities that were created by previous racially discriminatory 
practices.115 It should also be noted that the South African policy objectives of 
transformation and development of the economy to support the government’s 
economic goals of growth, employment and equity will only be achieved by 
increasing investment in and the competitiveness of the economy, and the 
broadening of economic participation in mainstream economic activities of 
previously excluded persons.116 It is has already been established in case law that 
the transformation process will unavoidably affect some members of society more 
adversely than others.117 
 
52 The transformative and reformative actions mandated by the Constitution are 
embodied in the Broad-Based Black Economic Empowerment programme which 
has been designed to directly address issues of economic redistribution and wealth 
creation for all South Africans.118 However, any such programmes, policies or other 
measures taken by the Government in order to effect transformation in South 
African society must be taken and carried out in accordance with the 
Constitution.119 The B-BBEE Act is the national legislation referred to in section 
                                                 
112 E. Cirmizi, “The Challenges of Bankruptcy Reform” (2012) 27(2) The World Bank Research 
Observer 199. 
113 The Broad-Based Black Economic Empowerment Act 53 of 2003 (hereafter the B-BBEE Act). 
114 As governed by the Employment Equity Act 55 of 1998 and the Promotion of Equality and 
Prevention of Unfair Discrimination Act 52 of 2002. 
115 See A. Janse Van Rensburg, “The constitutional framework for broad-based black economic 
empowerment” (unpublished LLD thesis, University of Free State, 2010) for in-depth discussion of the 
Broad Based Black Economic Empowerment principle. 
116 See “Overview of the Department of Trade and Industry”, available at: 
<http://www.thedti.gov.za/about_dti.jsp> [last viewed 30 August 2015]. 
117 Bato Star Fishing (Pty) Ltd v Minister of Environmental Affairs and Tourism and Others, at 
paragraph 76; Minister of Finance and Another v Van Heerden, at paragraph 145; Bel Porto School 
Governing Body and Others v Premier of the Province, Western Cape, and Another [2002] 3 SA 265 
(CC); 2002 9 BCLR 891 (CC), at paragraph 7. 
118 Van Rensburg, above note 115, at 121. 
119 Bato Star Fishing (Pty) Ltd v Minister of Environmental Affairs and Tourism and Others, above 
note 117, at paragraph 76; Bel Porto School Governing Body and Others v Premier of the Province, 
Western Cape, and Another, above note 117, at paragraph 7. 
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217(3) of the Constitution, providing for a legislative framework for the promotion 
of black economic empowerment.120 The objectives of the B-BBEE Act include the 
following:121 
 
 promoting economic transformation in order to enable meaningful participation of 
Black people in the economy; 
 achieving a substantial change in the racial composition of ownership and 
management structures and in the skilled occupations of existing and new enterprises; 
and 
 increasing the extent to which Black women own and manage existing and new 
enterprises, and increasing their access to economic activities, infrastructure and 
skills training. 
 
53 In our opinion, the lack of a detailed skills transfer framework is the single main 
obstacle to the successful implementation of the Ministerial Policy discussed 
above. Skills development and skills transfer is an important part of not only the 
Employment Equity Act (all companies who employ people are also subject to a 
skills levy), but a considerable part of the B-BBEE Act is also dedicated to skills 
development and skills transfer. This sentiment was echoed by Katz AJ in the South 
African Restructuring And Insolvency Practitioners Association case when he 
stated: 
 
“[t]he Respondents have not persuaded me that the Policy can be implemented in a manner 
which is not mechanical and rigid. There is explicitly no scope for considering the skills, 
knowledge, expertise and experience of practitioners when being appointed by the 
Master.”122 
 
54 The elephant in the room is thus the fact that the Ministerial Policy fails to 
address any transfer of knowledge and skills on a measurable scale. In drafting the 
Policy the main emphasis was on transformation and changing the racial profile of 
the profession. Even if the skills transfer policy is applied rationally, as our courts 
require, the words of the Labour Court in Naidoo v Minister of Safety and Security 
and Another123 about a “spectre of perverse race and gender rivalry” producing “in 
consequence confrontation and alienation”, are a reality and should be addressed. 
 
55 The significance of a modern insolvency system as a key foundation of 
sustainable economic development has widely been acknowledged and documented 
by international institutions such as the World Bank124 and Working Group V of 
                                                 
120 At: <https://www.thedti.gov.za/economic_empowerment/docs/National_Summit_Report.pdf> [last 
viewed 30 August 2015]. 
121 Section 2, Broad Based Black Economic Empowerment Act 53 of 2003. 
122 Above note 13, at paragraph 215. 
123 [2013] 5 BLLR 490 (LC); 2013 (3) SA 486 (LC); (2013) 34 ILJ 2279 (LC) (15 February 2013). 
124 See World Bank Principles for Effective Insolvency and Creditor/debtor Rights Systems (Revised 
2015), available at: <http://siteresources.worldbank.org/EXTGILD/Resources/5807554-
1357753926066/2015_Revised_ICR_Principles(3).pdf> [last viewed 30 August 2015] (also referred to 
as World Bank Principles for Effective Insolvency and Creditor/debtor Rights Systems). 
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the United Nations Commission on International Trade Law (UNCITRAL).125 
Furthermore, there is a general recognition that, in turn, those systems depend on 
the existence of strong and efficient regulatory frameworks.126 While the primary 
focus of the reform process of insolvency law and institutions should thus be on 
how best to serve the needs and interests of society, it would be unrealistic to 
ignore the wider global context in which trade and commerce take place. 
 
56 In the aftermath of the Asian financial crisis in the 1990s, the World Bank 
launched an initiative to improve the future stability of international financial 
systems.127 This took the form of a project to identify certain principles and 
guidelines for sound insolvency systems and for the strengthening of related debtor-
creditor rights in emerging markets, and in conjunction with international partner 
organisations the Principles and Guidelines for Effective Insolvency and Creditor 
Rights Systems were approved in 2001.128 The publication has recently been 
thoroughly reviewed and updated and the title changed to Principles for Effective 
Insolvency and Creditor/Debtor Regimes.129 In the executive summary of the 2015 
document the following significant statement is made: 
 
“Strong institutions and regulations are crucial to an effective insolvency system. The 
institutional framework has three main elements: the institutions responsible for insolvency 
proceedings, the operational system through which cases and decisions are processed, and 
the requirements needed to preserve the integrity of those institutions—recognizing that the 
integrity of the insolvency system is the linchpin for its success. A number of fundamental 
principles influence the design and maintenance of the institutions and participants with 
authority over insolvency proceedings.”130 
 
57 A general analysis of the global norms recognised by international institutions 
worldwide yields the conclusion that the essential proposition of insolvency 
practitioners in all systems is very similar: that every effective insolvency system 
requires competent and ethical insolvency practitioners who should have the 
experience and expertise necessary to deal with the range of business and legal 
issues which arise in insolvency matters.131 
 
                                                 
125 See UNCITRAL Legislative Guide on Insolvency Law (2005), available at: 
<http://www.uncitral.org/pdf/english/texts/insolven/05 - 80722_Ebook.pdf> [last viewed 30 August 
2015]. See further B. Wessels and G Boon (eds), Cross-Border Insolvency Law – International 
Instruments and Commentary (2015, Kluwer Law International, Deventer) for a collection of 
international and regional legal instruments relating to insolvency of companies, financial institutions, 
and consumers, as well as to corporate rescue law. 
126 K. Pistor, “The Standardization of Law and its Effect on Developing Economies” (2002) (50) 
American Journal of Comparative Law 101. 
127 B. Wessels, “Insolvency Law”, Chapter 28 in J. Smits, Elgar Encyclopedia of Comparative Law 
(2006, Edward Elgar Publishing, Cheltenham), at 305. 
128 Above note 124. 
129 Idem. 
130 Ibid., at 5. 
131 Ibid., see principle D8. 
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58 The international standards and guidelines on best practice recognise that in 
order to exercise powers and discharge functions, duties, responsibilities and 
accountabilities effectively, an office-holder should be suitable (or, in terms of 
some legislation, “fit and proper”); and by his or her conduct foster public 
confidence in the insolvency system.132 A trustee or liquidator appointed to 
administer an insolvent estate assumes certain statutory responsibilities and 
occupies a position of trust, not only towards creditors but also in regard to the 
insolvent debtor.133 
 
59 Principle D8 of the World Bank Principles states the following regarding the 
competence and integrity of insolvency practitioners: 
 
“The system should ensure that: - Criteria as to who may be an insolvency representative 
should be objective, clearly established, and publicly available; - Insolvency representatives 
be competent to undertake the work to which they are appointed and to exercise the powers 
given to them; - Insolvency representatives act with integrity, impartiality, and 
independence; and - Insolvency representatives, where acting as managers, be held to 
director and officer standards of accountability, and be subject to removal for incompetence, 
negligence, fraud, or other wrongful conduct.”134 
 
60 It is evident from various other international instruments that the determination 
of minimum qualifications is an integral and essential part of any effective 
insolvency law system. According to the UNCITRAL recommendations: 
 
“The insolvency law should specify the qualifications and qualities required for appointment 
as an insolvency representative, including integrity, independence, impartiality, requisite 
knowledge of relevant commercial law and experience in commercial and business matters. 
The insolvency law should also specify the grounds upon which a proposed insolvency 
representative may be disqualified from appointment.”135 
 
61 In a recent report, concluding a project conducted by the Organisation for 
Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) in partnership with the 
European Commission, the following statement was made: 
 
“Effective regulation to help meet the challenges facing governments will only be achieved 
through stronger regulatory governance, closing the loop between regulatory design and 
evaluation of outcomes. This draws attention to a range of issues, including: 
 institutional leadership and oversight; 
                                                 
132 World Bank Regulatory Working Group “Insolvency Law and the Regulatory Framework” on 
09/15/2000, available at: 
<http://web.worldbank.org/WBSITE/EXTERNAL/TOPICS/LAWANDJUSTICE/GILD/0,,contentMDK
:20154425~menuPK:146222~pagePK:64065425~piPK:162156~theSitePK:215006,00.html> [last 
viewed 30 August 2015]. 
133 Jacobs v Hessles 1984 3 SA 601 (T); see also Standard Bank of South Africa v The Master of the 
High Court, above note 20, at paragraph 133. 
134 Above note 124. 
135 UNCITRAL Legislative Guide on Insolvency Law, above note 125 (part two, chap. III, paras 35-74) 
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 reviewing the role of regulatory agencies and the balance between private and 
public responsibilities for regulation with a view to securing accountability and 
avoiding capture; 
 a renewed emphasis on consultation, communication, co-operation and co-
ordination across all levels of government and beyond, including not least the 
international arena; and 
 strengthening capacities for regulatory management within the public service.”136 
 
62 From the discussion above it is clear that the Ministerial Policy does not comply 
with international best practice, and that the South African insolvency profession 
should be properly regulated. Not only will proper regulation ensure compliance 
with international best practice, but it will also create a professional environment 
where practitioners are required to meet proper standards in regard to entry-level 
qualifications, training and continuing professional development. It is our 
considered opinion that attempts at transforming the insolvency profession through 
Ministerial Policy documents - such as the one that has already been struck down 
once as being unconstitutional - are doomed to failure, and even if the policy is 
found to be constitutional further down the line on appeal, it should be clear that 
the policy has already had a detrimental polarising effect on an extremely brittle 
profession. What is required is a properly regulated insolvency profession that not 
only ensures the integrity and competence of practitioners, but which 
simultaneously ensures the development and transfer of skills to new entrants to the 
profession. 
 
63 In 2003, there were various requests to the Department of Justice and 
Constitutional Development to properly regulate the profession, with some 
stakeholders going as far as providing the Minister with draft legislation in order to 
do so. It is unfortunate that this offer was never taken up, as by now the legislation 
could have been in operation for more than a decade - even taking into 
consideration possible delays in passing the legislation. In our view the government 





64 In the late 1990s, the UK reviewed their system of the regulation of insolvency 
practitioners by establishing the Insolvency Regulation Working Party, which 
included representatives from recognised insolvency bodies as well as the State.137 
The terms of reference were “to review the current state of regulation in the 
insolvency profession and in the light of the review to consider whether there are 
ways in which in the public interest and in the interest of all those affected by 
                                                 
136 C. Varley, “Regulatory Policy and the Road to Sustainable Growth”, presentation available at: 
<http://www.oecd.org/regreform/policyconference/46312747.pdf> [last viewed 30 August 2015]. 
137 F. Tolmie, Corporate and Personal Insolvency Law (2nd ed) (2003, Routledge-Cavendish, 
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insolvency proceedings, such regulation could be made more efficient and 
effective.”138 It is submitted that a similar committee or stakeholder’s group should 
be established with a similar assignment to review and investigate the current state 
of affairs in South Africa. 
 
65 Based on policy considerations, a series of recommendations that could improve 
and reform the regulatory structure of the South African insolvency law are 
suggested:139 
 
 A new insolvency regulatory framework should be developed articulating a set of 
criteria for the minimum level of entry qualifications; experience as well as the 
monitoring and overview of the system. Practitioners should be held to minimum 
standards of qualification and should be required to engage in continued educational 
requirements on a regular basis. 
 The emphasis should be on the principle of transfer of skills through either 
apprenticeship or other types of mentor structures.  
 In order to develop a system based on accountability, which would satisfy the public 
interest and create trust and confidence in the system, it would be vital to investigate a 
more cost effective mechanism of accountability and adopt a simpler and faster 





66 A well-functioning insolvency system should ensure that the resolution of 
financial distress maximizes the total value received by all interested parties.141 It is 
vital that an insolvency system contains sufficient measures of protection of the 
rights of creditors, as the ability of creditors to provide credit and capital is 
essential to the growth of a market economy. While the objective of any law reform 
process should be to accommodate the broader macro-economic policies into the 
insolvency system, it would be unrealistic to ignore the wider global context in 
which trade and commerce have effect.142 The main challenge will be to strike a 
balance between transposing current standards of best practice into the insolvency 
system, and having regard to the practical and political realities of the system itself. 
 
67 In deviating from a culture of authority to a culture of justification and 
accountability in South Africa it should be emphasized that the Constitution, 
especially the Bill of Rights, has fundamentally altered the way any state regulation 
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or administration is supposed to function.143 In attempting to formulate a workable 
definition of the term “public interest” relating to insolvency law, Keay states the 
following: 
 
“… [f]or the purpose of insolvency law, that the public interest involves taking into account 
interests which society has regard for and which are wider than the interests of those parties 
directly involved in any given insolvency situation, that is, the debtor and the creditors.”144 
 
68 The aim and purpose of any regulation in South African insolvency law should 
thus be to ensure compliance with the underlying values and norms of the 
Constitution, which include the protection of the public interest and of individual 
rights and freedoms.145 
 
69 Following the 2008 global financial crisis, one of the major trends that emerged 
among insolvency reformers was the introduction of professional requirements for 
insolvency practitioners.146 Capacity building of insolvency professionals is 
essential as a positive correlation between minimum qualifications requirements 
and higher recovery rates is evident.147 Failing to adequately prepare less 
experienced practitioners for practice will place a burden on the entire system, as 
inefficiencies in the process would evidently contribute to a greater loss for all 
stakeholders. Such losses are consistently transferred to market participants in the 
form of higher lending costs and fees, and more restricted access to credit. As 
insolvency practitioners perform skilled tasks that are crucial to the efficiency and 
effectiveness of the insolvency system, it is vital any law reform effort should 
comprise of a system where skills transfer is integrated into the system while still 
maintaining public confidence in the integrity of the credit system. 
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